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Abstract 
Conventional explanations of diversification and multinationality both point to size/growth 
related motives and firm-specific intangible assets as the driving forces. However, previous 
empirical studies have rarely exploited this commonality by investigating multinationality and 
diversification jointly. Using a database of leading EU firms, we devise a typology of firm 
structures which distinguishes diversification at home and abroad. This provides the framework 
for a sequential probit model which focuses on the roles of firm size and product differentiation. 
Our results suggest that multinationality and diversification are complementary in the presence 
of product differentiation, indicating that specific assets are a public good within the firm. In 
other cases, size factors are more dominant: multinationality increases with the firm's absolute 
size in its home country (presumably because production abroad becomes more profitable 
relative to exporting); however, diversification also increases more with market share (perhaps 
as a means of escaping constraints on further growth). In these circumstances, multinationality 
may become a substitute for diversification, since the latter is no longer the only route to 
growth; but the reverse is not true, since diversification does not affect the relative profitability 
of foreign production.  
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1. Introduction 
 Prevailing explanations of firm diversification and multinationality display 
striking similarities, both pointing to intangible firm-specific assets and constraints on 
growth in the firm's primary/home market as major causal factors. Yet, in spite of this 
commonality, the empirical literatures have remained largely independent. The present 
paper attempts to rectify this by examining these two dimensions of corporate structure 
simultaneously for a sample of leading firms in the European Union. The central idea is 
that, by distinguishing between a firms' foreign production in its primary and secondary, 
industries, we gain additional insights into the motives for multinationality, (and, 
equivalently, diversification). This opens up a series of questions, and we focus here on 
three: "Are diversification and multinationality substitute, or complementary 
strategies?"; "Do the typical empirical findings, that larger firms are more diversified 
and more multinational, derive from underlying causal forces, or are they merely the 
result of arithmetic identity-type relationships?"; and, more tentatively, "Is there a 
"typical" time path for corporate structure as firms grow?" 
 Section 2 briefly summarises the existing literature. Section 3 describes the 
database, and presents some descriptive facts on the sample relationships between 
aggregate firm size, multinationality and diversification. Section 4 shows that these 
aggregate descriptive statistics are a blunt tool for extracting underlying causal 
influences, and that disaggregation is necessary. As an alternative, section 5 introduces 
a typology of firm structure which distinguishes diversification abroad from 
diversification at home (i.e. separating multinationality in primary and secondary 
industries). Building on this, section 6 introduces a sequential probit model and tests it 
against the database. Section 7 concludes.  
2. Brief review of the literature 
 The conventional literatures on why firms choose to be multinational or 
diversified are sufficiently well known as to require only a brief rehearsal here1. The 
multinational firm is often viewed as having some special advantage which is 
                                                 
1  Two recent survey papers in the Journal of Economic Perspectives provide succinct summaries 
(Markusen, 1995, on multinationality, and Montgomery, 1994, on diversification). 
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commonly associated with product differentiation and/or technological know-how; and 
because of high transactions and agency costs, this is often best exploited in foreign 
markets by local production rather than by exporting or licensing (e.g. Dunning, 1981; 
Caves, 1996). Another recurring theme in the literature concerns the relative 
magnitudes of fixed and marginal costs when using different modes to serve a foreign 
market: at larger scales of output, multinationality is more profitable than exporting, as 
the gains from reduced transport costs and tariff jumping outweigh the fixed costs of 
setting up the foreign plant (e.g. Smith, 1987). Robust empirical support for these 
hypotheses is offered by positive correlations and regression coefficients between 
multinationality and firm size advertising and R&D expenditures (see Caves, pp. 7-13, 
for example). Very similar themes are evident in the diversification literature: 
technological spillovers and exploitation of brand names and advertising goodwill in 
adjacent industries are cited as major reasons for the multimarket firm (e.g. Scott, 
1993). The role of firm size is even more firmly entrenched in this literature (originating 
from Penrose, 1959), although the emphasis is more on diversification as a means for 
managers to pursue growth objectives when faced with constraints in their primary 
industry. 
 Of course, it is unsurprising that the two literatures are parallel, since 
multinational operations may be seen merely as geographical diversification. What is 
more interesting is whether a joint analysis offers additional insights. Perhaps most 
obviously, if both diversification and multinationality are driven by the same intangible 
asset story, why are some firms multinational without being diversified, and vice-versa? 
(Is the asset a ”public good” within the firm, or is it in finite supply?). Why do some 
firms diversify (go multinational) only in their country of origin (core industry), while 
others are also diversified (multinational) in other countries (industries)? Similarly, if 
multinationality and diversification are both strategies for escaping constraints to 
growth, are they typically pursued simultaneously or sequentially, and, if the latter, is 
there a "typical" sequence? 
 Very few previous studies have considered questions such as these. Indeed, 
formal theoretical modelling of the coincidence of multinationality and diversification 
seems to have been almost non-existent in the literature. However, there is a handful of 
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empirical studies; and Caves (1996, pp. 21-2 and 59-60) summarises accurately as 
follows:  
"Several authors investigated the relation between product-market diversification and 
foreign investment... The results are somewhat diverse and reflect differences in 
samples and measuring methods, but they are consistent with (a) short-run trade-
off...Other studies that compare product-market and geographic (international) 
diversification levels achieved by firms of varying sizes and maturities usually find 
positive correlations: given time and resources, a firm can exploit opportunities for 
diversifying in both directions, and the sorts of proprietary assets that support foreign 
investment are the same ones associated with "related" diversification."  
 
Broadly speaking then, multinationality and diversification are often found to be 
substitutes in the short-run, but not in the long-run. However, a number of these studies, 
especially those based on cross-section analysis of broad samples of firms, raise certain 
methodological worries. Pearce (1993) is particularly pertinent for our purposes: not 
only is his the most recent study of which we are aware, but also he employs a database 
quite similar to our own2. His central conclusions are:  
 
"diversification and internationalisation occur together, in a manner that may often 
imply a direct causal relationship which is only effectively opposed by resource 
constraints at relatively high levels." (ibid. p.147) 
 
and 
"The results for tests of firm size as an independent variable...indicate that of the two 
broad routes to growth...it is geographical diversification...that is relatively more 
prevalent than industrial diversification." (ibid., p.150).  
 
These comments are based on cross-firm OLS in which (i) a multinationality index is 
found to be a significantly positive determinant of a diversification index, and (ii) firm 
size is used as an explanatory variable to "explain" multinationality and diversification. 
We shall argue in section 4 that this sort of approach provides, at best, only a very 
blurred picture of the underlying mechanisms, and, at worst, it amounts to little more 
than estimating identities.  
                                                 
2  His sample comprises nearly 800 of the world's largest companies (although, many have to be 
excluded from the tests referred to here because of missing data on key variables, raising potential 
worries of sample selection bias). Moreover, his data are more aggregate than our own: he measures 
multinationality simply by the share of a firm's sales produced abroad, and diversification is only 
distinguished across broad two digit sectors. 
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3. The database and descriptive statistics 
 We employ an unusual new database on the corporate structures of a set of the 
leading (277) firms in the EU for 19873. It includes information for each firm on its 
production4 in each of up to 100 industries defined at the (NACE classification) 3-digit 
level, across the same 11 member states. However, it excludes firms' outputs outside 
manufacturing or the EU, and it relates to just a single year. The sample comprises all 
"leading" EU manufacturing firms, where a firm is defined as a "leader" if it is amongst 
the five largest producers (at the EU level) in at least one 3-digit manufacturing 
industry. For any firm meeting this criterion, data have been collected on the scale of its 
EU output in all industries in which it operates (including those in which it is not a 
leader). lts total EU production in each industry is also disaggregated into separate 
figures for each member state. Thus, for each firm, we observe a matrix, in which xjk 
refers to the firm's output in industry j (=1...100) in country k (=1...11). Obviously, this 
sample is deliberately heavily biased towards larger firms: it comprises nearly all of the 
EU's very largest firms, (according to our calculations, 97 of the top 100), as well as all 
firms with some degree of market power in individual industries. 
 For each firm, an aggregate index of diversification5 is estimated using Berry's 
(1975) traditional measure, and multinationality is defined in an analogous way: 
 D = 1 - Σj (xj.)2 / (x..)2        (1) 
                                                 
3  This database was first assembled as part of a wide ranging study on the competitive process, and its 
consequences for the structure of industries and firms in European Union (EU) manufacturing, and is 
fully discussed in Davies, Lyons et al (1996). The main source of information was company reports, 
supplemented by business directories and national production censuses. Considerable care, based on 
the knowledge of economists from the relevant country, was taken in grouping together all firms 
under the same ultimate ownership (the accounts of all subsidiaries and associates in which share 
ownership was at least 50% were consolidated). The 100 industries account for 99% of total EU 
manufacturing output, and the 313 firms in the original database account for about one third of this. 
The EU is defined here as the 12 member states in 1987, with Belgium and Luxembourg 
amalgamated. In the present paper, we exclude 36 firms from the original database which are 
subsidiaries of non-EU owned parents. For these firms in particular, non-EU operations are clearly of 
central importance to their corporate structures. 
4  Throughout the paper, "production" is used as shorthand for "sales by country of origin". Obviously, 
the term is slightly imprecise in that it ignores changes in stocks of finished products. On the other 
hand, we prefer not to refer to "sales" in order to avoid the implication that the data refer to sales by 
country of destination, which would be quite inappropriate when measuring multinational production. 
5  Throughout this paper "diversified" refers to multi-industry operations and will therefore include 
vertical operations. 
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 M = 1 - Σk (x.k)2 / (x..)2       (2) 
These indices have familiar properties6: a firm specialized in a single industry scores D 
= 0, while one spreading its output equally across N industries records D = (N-1)/N, 
tending to unity as N becomes large; similarly, a firm which operates in a single country 
records M = 0, while one having equal sized operations in S countries has M = (S-1)/S. 
 
Table 1  - Multinationality and Diversification: Descriptive Statistics 
Firm numbers and sample means 
 Specialised  Diversified  Total 
  Mean Values   Mean Values   Mean Values 
 no. D M no. D M no. D M 
Uninational 80 0 0.00 81 0.53 0.01 161 0.27 0.00 
Multinationa
l 
16 0 0.34 100 0.58 0.36 116 0.50 0.35 
Total 96 0 0.05 181 0.55 0.21 277 0.37 0.15 
 
 Nearly three-quarters of the firms are either diversified and/or multinational 
(Table 1)7, with diversification being more common: two-thirds of firms are diversified, 
whilst only two-fifths are multinational8. At first sight, there are no obvious signs that 
                                                 
6  Our preference for these particular indices merely reflects the widespread acceptance of Berry's D 
index in the existing literature. We are not sure whether M has ever been used in this way before - 
most previous studies appear not to have had access to such complete and disaggregated data - but it 
is perfectly appropriate for present purposes. 
7  We define a firm as diversified (multinational) only if its D(M) value exceeds 0.095. This effectively 
ignores “trivially small” amounts of diversification/multinationality which may be the result of 
measurement error. Our main datasources are company reports which are not always careful, when 
describing smaller subsidiaries, to define industry of production precisely, or to distinguish foreign 
production from merely selling operations. This critical value is not very exclusive: it corresponds to a 
hypothetical firm operating in two industries (countries), of which the main industry (country) 
accounts for 95% of the total. 
8  The typical extent of diversification is also higher than typical multinationality: 41% of the total 
output of all sample firms is produced outside their primary industries, whilst only 18% is produced 
outside their home countries. This is reinforced by the sample means for D and M reported in the 
Table (0.37 and 0.15); however, the latter comparison is sensitive, of course, to the greater scope for 
diversification as measured here - the NACE classification identifies 100 industries, whilst we 
consider only 11 countries. 
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the two strategies are either substitutes or complementary. The number of firms that are 
both diversified and multinational (100) is almost identical to the number opting for 
only one of the two strategies (97). Moreover, amongst the diversified set, there is no 
significant difference in the mean value of D between those which are also 
multinational and those which are not (0.58 and 0.53); similarly, the mean value of M 
for multinational firms does not differ significantly between those which are, or are not, 
also diversified. Regression analysis (not shown in the table) tends to confirm the 
conventional findings about firm size, multinationality, diversification relationships: D 
and M are both positively correlated with aggregate firm size (r = .27 and .28 
respectively), and are themselves significantly positively correlated (r = .32).  
4. Indices of Diversification and Multinationality: Identity Relationships 
 Whatever the scene-setting value of statistics such as these, we believe that they 
are quite inappropriate as tests of behavioural hypotheses. Since some of the previous 
studies mentioned above draw substantive conclusions from similar 
regression/correlation analysis, a brief justification of this view is called for. 
 Consider first the relationship to aggregate firm size. If diversification and/or 
multinationality are used by firms to overcome constraints on growth in their primary 
industry and home country, then they are best thought of as routes to growth - the 
means by which larger size is attained. It is misleading to impute a causal relationship 
flowing from large size to diversification or multinationality. The Appendix formalises 
this argument by deriving two accounting identities. In product space, firm size and 
diversification are related by:  
 FMSIZE = MS * IS * (1-D)-l       (3) 
where FMSIZE is the firm's aggregate size, MS is its "typical" market share, IS the 
"typical" size of industry in which it operates, and D is as defined above9. Thus firms 
may be large either because they achieve large market shares, and/or because they 
                                                 
9  As shown in the Appendix, the decompositions employ Herfindahl-type indices to represent "typical" 
values - this is necessarily the case, given that we use Herfindahl based indices for M and D. 
Alternatively, had we used, say, Entropy indices for M and D, then CS, NATS, MS and IS would 
need to be re-defined similarly. 
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operate in larger industries, and/or because they operate across a large number of 
industries. Holding MS and IS constant, there is a simple proportionate relationship 
between FMSIZE and D. For example, a firm operating on equal scales in ND 
industries, in each of which it has a market share of 10% of a total market size of 100, 
will have an aggregate size of 10*ND. The equivalent decomposition in geographic 
space is:  
 FMSIZE = CS * NATS * (1-M)-l      (4) 
where CS is the firm's "typical" share of aggregate country size, NATS is the size of the 
"typical" country in which it operates, and M is as defined above. 
 Turning to the relationship between diversification and multinationality, a 
distinction should be made between the firm's aggregate diversification and its 
diversification within individual countries (or, equivalently, between its aggregate 
multinationality and multinationality in individual industries). An extreme example of 
where they will differ radically is a vertically integrated MNE, which locates its entire 
output of industry A in country 1, and its entire output in industry B in country 2: this 
firm is both multinational and diversified in aggregate, whilst being completely 
specialised within each country, uninational in each industry. 
 Making this distinction, it can be seen that acts of diversification will typically 
also affect the firm's index of overall multinationality. This is most obvious where the 
firm diversifies abroad - simultaneously affecting both M and D - but, home 
diversification, by raising the proportion of the firm's aggregate output produced at 
home, will also tend depress its aggregate M value. In the Appendix, we formalise by 
deriving the following:  
 
 D = d + {(1-d).(M-m)/(1-m)}       (5) 
where d and m are "typical" within-country diversification and within-industry 
multinationality. Thus, aggregate diversification may be more/less than weighted 
average diversification within individual countries, depending on the precise pattern of 
multinationality within industries. In the above case of the vertical MNE, of size 100 in 
industry A in country 1 and 100 in B in 2, d = 0, but D = 0.5 since M = 0.5 and m = 0.  
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5. A Typology for Corporate Structure 
 In other words, aggregate indices of M, D and FMSIZE are jointly determined, 
and disaggregation is essential if we are to isolate underlying causal relationships. In 
fact, for the purposes of this paper, a straightforward approach turns out to be quite 
sufficient. We identify for each firm a primary industry and home country10, and 
estimate its multinationality in the former and diversification in the latter, MP and DH. 
The remainder of the firm's operations are measured by R, the proportion of production 
outside the primary industry and home country: R is a crude (but sufficient for what is 
to follow) measure of both diversification outside the home country and 
multinationality outside the primary industry.  
 Using these three statistics, we distinguish the eight broad classes of corporate 
structure depicted in the 2*2 matrices shown in Figure 111. The first three classes refer 
to firms which are not both multinational  and  diversified:  Class I  are specialist  (i.e. 
non-diversified) uninational firms; Class II are specialised multinationals; and Class III 
are diversified uninationals. Of course, these firms have already been identified in Table 
112. 
 The other five classes refer to different types of diversified-multinationals: 
Class IV are specialised at home and uninational in their primary industry, but produce 
in a secondary industry abroad (e.g. a purely vertical multinational). 
Class V are multinational, but only in their primary industry, and diversified, but only 
in their home country. 
                                                 
10  "Home country" is always identified as the country of origin: all but 11 of the firms produce more 
than half of their total EU output in their home country. "Primary industry" refers to the industry 
accounting for the largest proportion of the firm's total EU output: 194 firms produce more than half 
of their output in their main industry. However, for 74, the main industry accounts for 25-50% of total 
output, and for 9, it accounts for only 15-25%. In some cases then, there is an ambiguity in definition, 
and, as will be seen, this does introduce a certain arbitrariness in the classification of a few firms in 
the current sample. 
11  It has been pointed out to us that this matrix is reminiscent of the Ansoff matrix (1965) which may be 
familiar to readers conversant with the corporate strategy literature. As far as we know, that matrix 
has never been used in empirical applications such as this. 
12  There is one minor difference because we classify firms as uninational or specialist if they record 
trivially low values (less than 0.095) for M or D. In Table 1, this criterion is applied to aggregate 
values, but in Table 2 it is applied to MP and DH. This shifts four more firms into the "diversified 
multinational" classification in Table 2. 
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Class VI are specialised at home, but produce abroad in both primary and secondary 
industries. 
Class VII are diversified at home, but multinational only in secondary industries. 
Class VIII are diversified both at home and abroad, i.e. multinational in both primary 
and secondary industries. 
 
Table 2 - A Typology of Corporate Structure 
Class Number Mean Size  Mean Values  Number for 
 of firms (mn.ecus)  M D DH  which D<DH 
I 80 570 0.0 0.0 0.0  n.a.
II 14 2642 0.34 0.0 0.0  n.a.
III 79 1846 0.0 0.52 0.52  0
Diversified MNE    
of which: 
104 3671 0.35 0.57 0.57  65
IV 1 771 0.23 0.18 0.0  0
V 48 2981 0.28 0.45 0.49  48
VI 1 4724 0.75 0.68 0.0  0
VII 9 1849 0.24 0.69 0.63  0
VIII 45 4812 0.44 0.69 0.67  17
All Firms 277 2203 0.15 0.37 0.37  65
Note: A firm is considered to be diversified at home only if DH>0.095; multinational in its 
primary industry only if MP>0.095; and diversified abroad if R>0.05 (see footnote 7). 
 
 
In fact, only two of the five diversified multinational classes, V and VIII, are 
quantitatively important for this particular sample (Table 2)13. Indeed, there are only 11 
firms in classes IV, VI and VII, and an examination of the firms concerned suggests 
that, for some at least, there may be classificational ambiguities. Classes IV and VI each 
include only one firm - in both cases from the same small member state, Belgium - and 
since both have significant foreign operations in adjacent member states, the notion of a 
                                                 
13  This is not to deny, that, say, vertical MNEs might be a more common occurrence were we to widen 
our canvas to include operations outside the EU, notably the developing world. 
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home country is less meaningful in these cases. The nine firms in class VII are a 
heterogeneous grouping and some could very easily switch to other classes with only 
marginal changes in structure14. 
 In the next section, this typology provides the framework for formal model-
building, but, first, we draw out its implications for the accounting relationships 
between aggregate multinationality, diversification and firm size. Consider first, the 
purely arithmetic influence of multinationality on diversification (or vice-versa). 
One way of quantifying this is to examine how multinationality affects the firm's 
aggregate diversification relative to diversification in its home country. In a simple 2*2 
world, straightforward arithmetic shows that, for Classes IV, VI and VII, 
multinationality in a secondary industry must always increase aggregate diversification, 
whilst for Class V, multinationality confined to the primary industry must always 
reduce it. Only for Class VIII is the arithmetic effect arnbiguous, depending on the 
relative magnitudes in the 4 cells. In this sample, the deflationary effect dominates if 
measured by firm numbers (65 of the 104 diversified-multinationals have DH > D). This 
reflects the balance of two counteracting effects: while Class V is far more frequent 
than Classes IV, VI and VII, within Class VIII, more often than not, multinationality 
tends to increase aggregate diversification. As can be seen, the former effect dominates 
the latter.  
However, when judged by the overall sample means, the two effects exactly balance: 
mean D and DH are both 0.57 for the 104 firms concerned. This is because many Class 
V firms are only moderately multinational in their primary industry. 
 Second, abstracting from the three very small classes (IV, VI and VII), and 
momentarily ignoring Class II, there is a tendency for mean size of firm to increase as 
we move up through the four main classes. Class III firms are significantly larger 
than Class I; Class V are significantly larger than III, and Class VIII are significantly 
larger than Class V. This is consistent with a stylised story, in which a firm first 
diversifies at home before then going multinational in its primary industry, and finally 
                                                 
14  Two are conglomerates with large operations outside manufacturing, and one is a UK firm with 
traditionally strong interests in Ireland (Guinness): for these three firms, our classification scheme is 
arguably too simplistic. Similarly, three firms have only small foreign production (between 5 and 
9%), and they are close to being classified in Class III. 
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diversifying abroad (i.e. a sequence of  I → III → V → VIII). Each step increases the 
firm's aggregate size, and this gives rise to positive (albeit non-linear) correlations 
between M, D and FMSIZE. It is not so much that greater size facilitates 
multinationality and diversification, but rather that these strategies lead to larger size. 
 Of course this is only a stylisation, and one which is clearly inapplicable to the 
14 Class II firms who have gone multinational without being diversified. Note also that 
their mean size is not significantly smaller than Class V, and so, for these firms at least, 
a Class II structure may not be an intermediate stage on the way to Class VIII. Until a 
time dimension is added to the database, the question of a "typical" time path must 
largely remain speculation; however, these magnitudes do tend to confirm our earlier 
argument that size will almost inevitably rise with diversification and multinationality, 
even without direct causality.  
6. A Behavioural Model 
 We now turn to a formal model designed to avoid these arithmetic accounting 
relationships. We use a sequential framework, which builds from the typology by 
distinguishing diversification at home and abroad, and by employing disaggregated 
measures of size. We make the implicit assumption that firms do not typically choose to 
diversify abroad before diversifying at home, or go multinational in secondary before 
primary industries. (In effect, we ignore Classes IV, VI and VII). 
Stage 1:  the initial decisions on home diversification and primary  
multinationality (a) the role of size 
Consider first the firm's decisions on whether or not to diversify at home, and whether 
or not to go multinational in its primary industry. For home diversification, suppose 
that the probability a firm will be diversified in its home country is given by the 
probability that its size in its home country primary industry, SIZEPH, exceeds some 
critical level, SIZED*:  
 P{DH>0} = P{SIZEPH > SIZED*}      (6) 
A special case of this would be where firms choose to diversify at home, once their 
primary industry market share exceeds some threshold, say λ%, i.e. SIZED* = 
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λ*INDSIZEPH, where INDSIZEPH is the size of the home country primary industry. 
In that case, for firms in a given industry, the probability curve would be a simple step 
function, as shown in figure 2. Alternatively, when observed, as here, across a pooled 
sample of industries, critical size would have a distribution which merely mirrors that of 
industry sizes in the sample.  
 
 
Figure 2 
 
 
 
 
 More generally, however, we would expect the threshold market share to vary 
both between industries, and between firms within industries, depending on the motives 
of managers, market structure, etc. Furthermore, size effects need not be confined 
exclusively to market shares; absolute size may also be important, for example, in 
determining the gains from diversification due to economies of scope and demand 
spillovers. Thus, SIZED* will vary across firms according to a vector of firm and 
industry-level characteristics, including industry size. Therefore, critical size is defined 
as a random variable, with mean µD and variance σ2D, and the step function generalises 
to the dotted sigmoid curve shown in figure 2, which is merely the cumulated SIZED* 
distribution. The magnitude of σ2D will then reflect the relative strength of these other 
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characteristics as determinants of diversification; where their effects dominate that of 
firm size, σ2D will be "large" and the curve relatively flat.  
 Multinationality in primary industry is modelled identically: 
 P{MP  > 0} = P{SIZEPH > SIZEM*}      (7) 
where SIZEM* is another random variable, denoting a "critical" level of size for going 
multinational, with mean µM and variance σ2M. 
 These hypotheses are tested econometrically using a bivariate probit model, with 
two zero-one dependent variables regressed against the logarithms of SIZEPH and 
INDSIZEPH. Four implications follow from this specification. First, because size is 
measured by the firm's operations in its home country primary industry, and given the 
simple binary nature of the dependent variable, there is little danger of a reverse 
causality. Second, the use of probit analysis, with firm size logged, makes the implicit 
assumption that critical size is lognormally distributed15. Although there is no 
theoretical necessity for any particular distribution, the lognormal is a very plausible 
candidate: critical size is clearly non-negative and if it is the product of a large number 
of independent influences, then the multiplicative form of the central limit theorem 
offers a reasonable genesis for the lognormal. Third, bivariate probit analysis 
acknowledges that SIZED* and SIZEM* may be correlated across firms; if so, it will 
offer an efficiency gain over estimating the two equations separately. Fourth, 
INDSIZEPH and SIZEPH are included as separate regressors, without restrictions to 
allow for the likelihood that there is an absolute firm size, as well as a market share, 
effect. 
                                                 
15  If critical size is lognormal, then using the notation of Aitchison and Brown (1957), SIZED* is Λ(µD, 
σ2D), and P{DH > 0} = N{(logSIZEPH - µD)/ σD |0,1}. This is a linear relation between the normal 
equivalent deviate of the probability and logSIZEPH, as in a standard probit model, with an intercept 
term of -µD/σD and a slope of 1/σD. 
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Table 3 - Probit (Logit) Analysis of the Probability of Diversification/ Multinationality 
1. Basic Model, Bivariate Probit 
 Const SIZEHP INDSIZEHP
P{MP  > 0} -1.921*** 0.279*** -0.002 
 (0.489) (0.063) (0.039) 
P{MH  > 0} -0.541 0.249*** -0.106** 
 (0.482) (0.057) (0.042) 
             LL =  -307, rho = 0.540   
2. Product Differentiation, Bivariate Probit 
 NON-DIFF*  DIFF* 
 Const SIZEHP INDSIZEHP  Const SIZEHP INDSIZEHP
P{MP  > 0} -2.145*** 0.285***   -0.900 0.160*  
 (0.621) (0.105)    (0.583) (0.086)  
P{MH  > 0} -1.006 0.378*** -0.149***  -0.622 0.153* 0.062 
 (0.657) (0.101) (0.046)  (0.857) (0.091) (0.094) 
             LL =  -297, rho = 0.524   
3. Distinguishing Classes, Multinomial Logit 
 NON-DIFF*                 DIFF* 
 Const SIZEHP INDSIZEHP  Const SIZEHP  
Class II -5.088** 0.740** -0.118  -2.918 0.246  
 (2.526) (0.372) (0.168)  (2.195) (0.328)  
Class III -1.780 0.718*** -0.366***  -0.859 0.150  
 (1.336) (0.212) (0.103)  (1.331) (0.207)  
Classes -4.215*** 0.948*** -0.216**  -1.371 0.346*  
V & VIII (1.535) (0.233) (0.105)  (1.192) (0.183)  
             LL =  -293   
Wald Tests 
(i) DIFF v NON-DIFF  (ii) Inter Class  NON-DIFF(3) DIFF(2) 
Equation 22.51*** (9)  II  v  III  23.8***   9.8*** 
Class II   2.36    (3)  II  v/VIII  15.7*** 26.4*** 
Class III 13.57*** (3)  III v/VIII    5.2 11.4*** 
Class V/VIII 10.22**   (3)      
4. Diversification Abroad, Univariate Probit 
 Const SIZEHP  
Class VIII -2.188*** 0.288***  
v Class V (0.871) (0.115) LL = -61 
    
SIZEHP and INDSIZEHP are logged; N = 266, but, for (4), n=93; significance levels: *10%, **5%; *** 1%. 
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 Equation (1) in table 3 confirms a significantly positive role for SIZEPH for 
both diversification and multinationality. Industry size has the expected negative (and 
significant) effect on diversification, but it is insignificant for multinationality: for 
multinationality, it is the firm's absolute size alone which matters, but, for 
diversification, there appears to be both market share and absolute size effects at 
work16. The coefficient on SIZEPH does not differ significantly between the two 
equations, but the intercept does, implying that the mean of the critical size distribution 
is lower for diversification than for multinationality. This is reflected by figure 3, in 
which the implied probability curve for home diversification against SIZEPH (evaluated 
at sample mean values for INDSIZEPH) is always higher than that for primary 
multinationality. Finally, the estimated correlation between the residuals of the two 
equations is +0.542, implying, in turn, a positive correlation between the two critical 
sizes: on balance, multinationality and diversification are complementary strategies in a 
sense to be discussed more fully below17. 
 
Figure 3 
 
                                                 
16  The restriction of (absolute) equality in the coefficients on SIZEPH and INDSIZEPH in the 
diversification equation is rejected at the 5 % level. 
17  The efficiency gain from estimating the two equations jointly in bivariate probit analysis is revealed 
by comparing the log-likelihood for (1) with the sums of the ratios when estimating the equations 
separately: -307 against -153 (+) -179 = -332. 
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 (b) the role of specific assets 
Obviously, this model can be enriched, given available data, by specifying some of the 
other determinants of critical size. Of particular interest is the role of firm specific 
assets, especially those associated with product differentiation, and as revealed by high 
advertising and R&D outlays. Unfortunately, comparable firm-level data on these and 
other variables are currently unavailable, and so we proceed in an indirect way. Using 
industry-level data, we have constructed a binary dummy variable, DIFF, which takes 
the value 1 if the firm's primary industry is typically characterised by "high" levels 
of advertising and/or R&D expenditures. Thus, DIFF should be interpreted as an 
indicator of the intrinsic nature of the firm's main industry, rather than as a proxy for 
how much the firm spends. The implication is that the classification is not country - or 
time - specific, and that leaders in such industries must inevitably possess some specific 
asset18. 
The hypothesis is that the parameters of the critical size distributions will differ between 
DIFF and NON-DIFF firms. The expectation is that firm-specific assets make each 
strategy more likely, at any firm size, thus mean critical size should be lower for DIFF 
firms; expectations are less clearcut for the variance, but, if firm size becomes relatively 
less important where specific assets are pronounced, then it will be higher for DIFF 
firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18  DIFF is constructed from Italian and UK data on  R&D and advertising spends (see Davies, Lyons, et 
al. 1996). One other implication of the binary form of this variable is that it minimises the likelihood 
of simultaneity with both diversification and multinationality. 
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Figure 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 Equation (2) reports the result of re-estimating the bivariate model separately for 
DIFF and NON-DIFF firms19. The log-likelihood is reduced from 307 to 297 and the 
appropriate Wald tests allow us to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients are the 
same for DIFF and NON-DIFF - both for the equation as a whole (19.1), and for the 
diversification and multinational components individually (10.6 and 9.1 respectively). 
The implied point estimates of the parameters of critical size confirm expectations: 
DIFF reduces the mean but increases the variance, making both multinationality and 
diversification more likely at most firm sizes, as well as diluting the strength of the firm 
size effect. In fact, as shown in Figure 4, although both probability curves are shifted 
upwards by DIFF, in the case of diversification, the larger variance means that the 
probability is actually slightly lower, but still very high, at very large firm sizes. 
                                                 
19  INDSIZEHP  continues to be completely insignificant in the multinationality equation and is excluded 
from the equation reported in the table. 
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Stage 2: interaction between primary multinationality and home diversification 
So far, the model is silent, theoretically, on the relationship between the two initial 
decisions, although, econometrically, the rho values in equations (1) and (2) imply that 
there is a connection, in that there is a positive correlation between the residuals in the 
component equations. This suggests, in turn, a positive correlation between SIZEM* and 
SIZED*; and, in this sense, we can define the two strategies as complementary. Of 
course, this statistical association is open to various interpretations, and it does not 
necessarily imply causality. For example, it might merely reflect a tendency for firms to 
have similar "tastes" for multinationality and diversification. One reason might be that 
managers with preferences for empire building and growth maximising see both 
strategies as potential (not mutually exclusive) avenues for securing their objectives. 
Similarly, (and perhaps more convincingly), firms may possess specific assets which 
can be exploited equally in both geographic and product spaces. However, there might 
also be a more causal explanation: where a firm has already gone multinational, this 
may then facilitate diversification (or vice-versa). In terms of the model, the critical size 
with respect to one strategy may change, as and when, the firm follows the other 
strategy. Without a time dimension to the data, we can not discriminate decisively 
between these alternatives, but can pursue this question a little further by reintroducing 
the typology as follows. 
 Equation (3) in the Table takes disaggregation one step further by distinguishing 
multinational firms that are also diversified from those that are not. In other words, 
there are now three groups of firm - Classes II, III, and V amalgamated with VIII20 - to 
compare with the default, Class I. This is an obvious extension of the bivariate model, 
but we are unable to use the obvious econometric extension, multivariate probit, in the 
absence of any available computer programme21. Fortunately, multinomial logit is a 
good second best, given the close similarity of the logistic and normal distributions. 
 
                                                 
20  Because we continue to focus only on primary industry multinationality and home diversification, 
there is no distinction between Class V and Class VIII firms at this stage. 
21  As Greene, 1993, p. 663, explains, "The practical obstacle to such an extension is the evaluation of 
higher order multivariate normal integrals". 
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 Figure 5 is a graphical representation of the results, separated into NON-DIFF 
and DIFF. Each curve refers to a bilateral comparison between the relevant class and 
the default (evaluated at mean values of INDSIZEPH). In this case, there are two sets of 
Wald tests, one comparing DIFF and NON-DIFF, and the other making inter-class 
comparisons. 
 The DIFF v. NON-DIFF comparisons are straightforward and they largely 
confirm the bivariate probit results. As can be seen, the probability curves are generally 
far less sensitive to firm size where specific assets are more likely. Indeed, we can now 
see that it is only amongst the Class V/VIII firms (i.e. diversified/multinationals) that 
size has any significant influence at all for the DIFF group. The Wald tests confirm that 
the equations differ significantly between DIFF and NON-DIFF subgroups, both for the 
model as a whole, and for Classes III and V/VIII separately. On the other hand, the 
Class II curve does not differ significantly between DIFF and NON-DIFF, i.e. for firms 
that are only multinational, size is the only significant discriminator when compared 
with specialised uninational firms. Within the NON-DIFF sub-set, the results on size are 
also in line with those of the bivariate probit: for all three classes, firm size is always 
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significant when compared with the default, but industry size is only significant for 
diversification (Classes III and V/VIII). 
 However, the more interesting new insights concern the differences between 
classes. In order to interpret the appropriate Wald tests, consider first the meaning of 
each curve.  
 (i) Curve II compares firms that are solely multinational with those that are not 
multinational or diversified, and it therefore portrays the probability of being 
multinational, conditional on not being diversified 
 (ii) Curve III compares firms that are solely diversified with those that are not 
multinational or diversified, and it therefore portrays the probability of being 
diversified, conditional on not being multinational 
 (iii) Curve V/VIII compares firms that are both multinational and diversified 
with those that are neither. Here, the main interest lies not so much with straight 
comparison between Class V/VIII and the default, but more in comparisons with the 
two other curves. Thus, V/VIII relative to II compares firms that are multinational and 
diversified with those that are solely multinational, from which we can deduce the 
relative magnitudes of the probability of being multinational, conditional on being 
diversified and the probability of being multinational, conditional on not being 
diversified. Similarly, V/VIII relative to III reveals the relative magnitudes of the 
probability of being diversified, conditional on being multinational and the 
probability of being diversified, conditional on not being multinational. 
 Within the DIFF sub-set, the Wald tests show that the three curves differ 
significantly from each other: as shown by the figure, the probabilities of being solely 
diversified or solely multinational (particularly the latter) are typically quite low for 
DIFF firms. Comparing V/VIII with II and III, the conditional probability of being 
multinational is higher for diversified firms than for non-diversified firms and the 
conditional probability of being diversified is higher for multinational firms than for 
non-multinationals. In other words, where specific assets are likely to be important, if 
firms are multinational then they are also probably diversified, and vice-versa. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis of complementarity driven by specific assets which can 
be exploited both geographically and in product space - the specific asset is a public 
good within the firm. 
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 Within the NON-DIFF sub-set, a visual comparison of the II and V/VIII curves 
shows that the conditional probability of being multinational is also higher for 
diversified firms than for non-diversified firms; and the Wald test confirms that the 
difference is strongly significant. Apparently then, complementarity continues to apply 
even when specific assets are less likely. On the other hand, a visual comparison of III 
with V/VIII suggests that the conditional probability of being diversified is lower for 
multinationals than for non-multinationals, except at extremely large firm sizes. This is 
the first evidence that multinationality and diversification may sometimes be 
substitutes. However, in this instance, the Wald test shows the difference to be only 
weakly significant, at slightly less than the 10% level. Nevertheless, there would appear 
to be a paradox. For NON-DIFF firms, the two strategies seem to be complements 
looked at from one direction, but not from the other (indeed, if anything, the weak 
evidence is that they are substitutes). 
 In fact, we believe that there is no paradox, and that the explanation lies in the 
different size-motives for multinationality and diversification. As we have just seen, for 
NON-DIFF firms, both strategies are largely driven by size considerations: 
diversification removes the constraint on growth otherwise imposed by a large primary 
industry market share, whilst, for multinationality, it is absolute size rather than market 
share which matters - once the firm achieves a certain size in its home country, 
multinationality becomes a viable alternative to exporting. But, if this is so, it follows 
that the growth incentive for diversification will be reduced if the multinationality 
option has already been taken, since expansion can now be effected geographically 
without recourse to diversification. On the other hand, the incentive for multinationality 
remains unchanged, whether or not the firm is diversified - the cost-effectiveness of 
foreign production relative to exporting in the primary industry is unaltered by 
diversification into other industries at home.  
 However, this alone can be only part of the story, since we have found that the 
probability of multinationality is higher (rather than no different) for diversified firms 
and that the probability of diversification is only weakly significantly lower for 
multinational firms. This might suggest that, after allowing for these differential size 
considerations, there is still an underlying residual complementarity in both cases. We 
can only speculate on why this might be, but one possibility is that some firm-specific 
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assets are not necessarily associated with high advertising and/or R&D spends, such as 
general managerial skills.  
 
Stage 3: Foreign Diversification 
 We turn finally to foreign diversification (i.e. secondary multinationality), which 
we model quite simply in terms of the conditional probability that a firm will be 
diversified abroad, given that it is already diversified at home and multinational in its 
primary industry. 
 In terms of the typology, this amounts to a straight comparison of Class V with 
Class VIII22, which can be modelled simply using univariate probit, allowing the 
parameters to differ between DIFF and NON-DIFF. However, in this case, INDSIZEPH 
is not included since a high home primary industry market share is not a constraint on 
growth for a firm already diversified at home and multinational in its primary industry. 
Similarly, SIZEPH is no longer an appropriate measure of firm size, and instead, we use 
SIZEP&H, the firm's total output in its primary industry and its home country, i.e. 
aggregate size exclusive of production in secondary industries. 
 Here, there is no significant evidence of a difference in the equation between 
DIFF and NON-DIFF firms, and the reported equation (4) in the Table is confined 
merely to examining the role of size. As can be seen, it is positively significant23. It 
appears that foreign diversification can be explained as an alternative avenue for 
expansion, once firms have diversified at home and gone multinational in their primary 
industry. However, we are reluctant to conclude that specific assets have no role to play 
in this "final" stage, since the majority of firms in both Classes V and VIII originate 
from DIFF industries, rendering this particular proxy especially imprecise in this stage. 
                                                 
22  In other words, we continue to ignore the 11 firms in Classes IV, VI and VII. As mentioned already, 
there are doubts about the robustness of the classification for some of these firms. In any event, they 
constitute too small a sub-sample to support econometric examination. 
23  We also experimented with three other size measures: SIZEPH, the firm's size in its primary industry 
across all countries, and its total home country size. None achieved the same significance level as 
SIZEP&H; indeed, each attracts a negative sign when included alongside SIZEP&H. 
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7.  Implications and Conclusions 
 The key premise of this paper is that, because diversification and 
multinationality are often inextricably linked, a joint investigation should provide 
deeper insights into their causes than can be gleaned from studying the two phenomena 
separately. Our database is in many ways ideal for this purpose: leading EU 
manufacturing firms display a variety of different corporate structures, and a large 
number are diversified both at home and abroad - precisely the conditions where 
multinationality and diversification are most obviously interdependent. 
 Two recurring results in the previous literatures are that diversification and 
multinationality are both more common in larger firms, and where specific assets are 
important. Our own results tend to confirm these "stylised facts", but with important 
qualifications and extensions. First, we have argued that positive correlation (or 
regression) coefficients linking aggregate firm size to diversification and/or 
multinationality are not conclusive evidence of causality. Rather, they are open to 
purely arithmetic identity-type explanations - unless multinational/diversificational 
expansion is a perfect substitute for home country operations in the core industry, it 
must necessarily entail an increase in the firm's aggregate size. For this reason, we have 
modelled the decision-making process as sequential, distinguishing home from foreign 
diversification, and primary from secondary multinationality. This leads to more refined 
formulations of the size hypotheses: for example, is home diversification related to the 
size of the firm in its home primary industry? Generally speaking, the significance of 
size remains robust to this sort of disaggregation, but some important qualifications now 
emerge. Some concern differences between the two strategies. Thus, whilst the 
probability of home diversification is found to depend on the firm's market share, as 
well as its absolute size in its home industry, the probability of primary multinationality 
depends only on the firm's absolute size in its home country primary industry. This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that firms turn to diversification as an alternative route to 
expansion, once their primary industry market share becomes large. On the other hand, 
primary multinationality is more likely to be activated once size exceeds some critical 
absolute level, and this is because foreign production becomes relatively more attractive 
(compared to exporting) once the scale of operations is sufficiently high to merit 
additional fixed costs abroad. Turning to foreign diversification (or, equivalently, 
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secondary industry multinationality), we find that size continues to be important, but, in 
this case, it is the firm's size aggregated across its primary industry in all countries and 
across all its industries in its home country. This is consistent with the hypothesis that 
foreign diversification is viewed as a further potential source of expansion. 
 Specific assets also play an important part in the story. More precisely, we find 
that, in general, home diversification and primary multinationality are both more likely 
where the firm originates from an industry characterised by high advertising and/or 
R&D. Our interpretation is that leading firms in this type of industry almost inevitably 
possess some specific asset associated with product differentiation. Interestingly, in 
these industries, the statistical significance of firm size measures is much reduced, 
suggesting that these strategies are motivated more by focused exploitation of a specific 
asset than by expansion per se. 
 Our most intriguing results concern the interplay between the two strategies. In 
most cases, home diversification and primary multinationality are found to be 
complementary, in that firms which are multinational in their core industry are also 
more likely to be diversified at home, and vice-versa. This is an unambiguous result for 
firms associated with differentiation, and the implication is that specific assets are 
typically a public good within the firm, if they can be exploited across countries, they 
can also typically support expansion in product space. Indeed, relatively few firms in 
this category opt for only one of the two strategies. However, where firms originate 
from industries in which specific assets and differentiation are less likely, while it 
remains true that diversified firms are more likely to be multinational than non-
diversified firms, there is no evidence that multinationals are more likely to be 
diversified than non-multinationals (there is weakly significant evidence that the reverse 
is true). Our explanation is that the growth motivation for diversification is diluted once 
the firm has already chosen the multinational option, whilst the advantage of foreign 
production over exporting remains unaltered by home diversification. 
 Finally, we should acknowledge that this study is limited because the database is 
still at a fairly preliminary stage in its development. It is confined to a single year, with 
no information on firms' activities outside manufacturing or outside the EU. Obviously, 
this means we have measured multinationality and diversification more narrowly than is 
desirable, and it has also constrained our ability to pursue some hypotheses 
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satisfactorily. For example, patterns in the data are suggestive of a typical growth path, 
in which firms first diversify at home, then go multinational in their primary industry, 
and finally diversify abroad. Until a dynamic dimension is added to the database, this 
hypothesis must await more rigorous analysis.  
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 1/1997 
 28
References 
 
Aitchison, A. and Brown, J. (1957) The Lognormal Distribution, Cambridge University 
Press.  
Ansoff, I. (I965) Corporate Strategy, New York, McGraw-Hill.  
Berry, C.H. (1975) Corporate Growth and Diversification, Princeton, Princeton 
University Press.  
Caves, R.E. (1996) Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.  
Davies, S.W., Lyons, B.R. et al. (1996) Industrial Organization in the EU, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.  
Dunning, J.H. (1981) International Production and the Multinational Enterprise, 
London, George Allen and Unwin  
Greene, W.H. (1993) Econometric Analysis, (2nd edition), MacMillan, New York.  
Markusen, J.R., "The Boundaries of Multinational Enterprises and the Theory of 
International Trade", Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol.9, Spring, 169-189.  
Montgomery, C.A. (1994) "Corporate Diversification", Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol.8, Summer, 163-178  
Pearce, R.D. (1993) The Growth and Evolution of Multinational Enterprise, Edward 
Elgar, Aldershot.  
Penrose, E. (1959) The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, Oxford, Blackwell.  
Scott, J.T. (1993) Purposive Diversification and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press.  
Smith, A. (1987) "Strategic Investment, Multinational Corporations and Trade Policy, 
European Economic Review, 31, 89-96. 
 
Ceris-CNR, W.P. N° 1/1997 
 29
Appendix 
 
Identity relationships between firm size, multinationality and diversification  
Recall that FMSIZE denotes the firm's size (x..) aggregated across all industries and 
countries, and its overall diversification and multinationality are defined as: 
 D = 1 - Σj (x j.)2/(x..)2        (1) 
 M = 1 - Σk (x.k) /(x..)2        (2) 
(i) Decomposition of firm size in product space 
Denote the firm's market share in industry j by MSj = xj./Sj, where Sj denotes the 
aggregate size of industry j, and substitute into (1): 
 D = 1-Σj (MSj)2Sj2/(x..)2       (A1) 
Next define its "typical" market share as the weighted average market share across 
industries: 
 MS = ΣjMSj(xj./x..)        (A2) 
and combine (A1) and (A2) to give 
 MS(l-D)-1 = x..[ΣjMSjxj.] / [ΣjMSj2(Sj2)]     (A3) 
Next define an index of the typical size of industry124in which the firm operates as: 
 IS = Σj(wj.Sj)         (A4) 
where  wj = (xj.MSj)/Σ(xj.MSj)       (A5) 
then  IS = ΣjSjxj.MSj/Σ(xj.MSj) = ΣjSj2MSj2/Σ(xj.MSj)    (A6) 
Substituting (A6) into (A3) and rearranging, it follows that: 
 FMSIZE = x.. = MS * IS * (1-D)-1       (A7) 
 
                                                 
1  Some comment is needed in interpreting the IS index. As can be seen, for firm i, it is a weighted 
average size of all the industries in which the firm operates. Since the weights depend on the size of 
the firm's presence in the industry times its market share, this index is firm specific. This means that 
industry j is given more weight in the index if the firm's operations in that industry are both important 
to the firm and significant in the industry. 
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(ii) Decomposition of firm size in geographic space 
The analogous decomposition across countries is derived algebraically in an identical 
way, by merely replacing market share and industry size for industry j with country 
share (CS) and country size (NATS) for country k: 
 FMSIZE = x = CS * NATS * (1-M)-1      (A8) 
(iii) Relationship between multinationality and diversification  
Denote the firm's diversification within country k by  
 Dk = 1 - Σj (xjk)2 / (xk)2        (A9) 
and the "typical" (weighted average) value of this across countries as225 
 d = ΣkvkDk  where  vk = xk2 /Σxk2       (A10) 
Similarly, denote multinationality in j and typical multinationality by: 
 Mj = 1 - Σk (xjk)2/(xj)2         (A11) 
and  
 m = ΣjwjMj  where  wj = xj2/Σxj2       (A12) 
First substituting (A9) into (A10) and (A11) and (A12) and then equating the two 
expressions yields:  
 (1-m) Σjxj2 = (1-d)Σkxk2        (A13) 
Then substituting in (1) and (2) gives: 
 (1-m)(1-D) = (1-d)(1-M)        (A14) 
Finally, simple manipulation gives: 
 D = d + {(1-d).(M-m)/(1-m)}       (A15) 
                                                 
2  Note that the unusual weighting structure in defining "typical" is dictated by the nature of Herfindahl 
type indices. The weights, so defined, sum to unity and attach relatively more importance to the larger 
industries (countries). 
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